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Withdrawal of Life Support: Individual
Autonomy Against Alleged State Interests
in Preserving Life
Michelle Oberman *
Cuanto vive el hombre, por fin?
Vive mil dias o uno solo?
Una semana o varios siglos?
Por cuanto tiempo muere el hombre?'
I. INTRODUCTION
Nancy Cruzan is a thirty-year-old woman who lies in a perma-
nent vegetative state, quadriplegic, spastic, and so severely brain
damaged that she is wholly "oblivious to her environment except
for reflexive responses to sound and perhaps to painful stimuli."2
She lacks the cognitive or reflexive ability to swallow food or water
and, therefore, is maintained by a gastrostomy tube through which
nutrition and hydration are provided.3 On November 16, 1988, the
Missouri Supreme Court denied her parents' request that life sup-
port be terminated and ruled that the feedings by a gastrostomy
tube must be continued.' According to medical experts, she could
"live" in this manner for another thirty years. Surprisingly, the
Missouri court refused to follow long-standing policy in other ju-
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1. How much does man live, after all?
Does he live a thousand days, or one only?
For a week, or for several centuries?
How long does man spend dying?
P. NERUDA, ESTRAVAGARIO (1958).
2. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240
(1989).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 426.
5. Id.
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risdictions in which families and guardians of patients in similar
conditions were allowed to refuse life-sustaining treatment.6
The Missouri court justified its decision in Cruzan by asserting
that various state interests compelled judicial intervention.7 At the
same time, the court also minimized the well-established individual
right to refuse medical treatment.8 Although Cruzan is the first
modern case to hold that life support must be maintained because
of a state interest in preserving life,9 this ruling is only the logical
extension of reasoning which seeks to balance an individual's right
to refuse treatment against a state interest. The state's capacity to
overrule a refusal of treatment is inherent even in the formulation
of those decisions which did allow patients or their guardians to
refuse treatment.'0
This Article will argue that the state's role in cases involving the
permanently incompetent patient should not entail the balancing of
an abstract interest in preserving life against the patient's right to
refuse treatment, but rather should be to ascertain whether the in-
dividual would have chosen to accept life-sustaining treatment in
her I present situation. This argument is founded on the belief that
an individual should not lose the privacy or autonomy rights of a
competent person upon becoming incompetent.' 2
After a brief review of the right to refuse medical treatment, I
will examine the underlying premise for state intervention in cases
involving the refusal of medical treatment in general, and life sup-
port in particular, by both competent and incompetent patients.
With the clarified role of the state in mind, I will explore and re-
construct the incompetent patient's right to refuse medical treat-
6. See generally Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 992 (1976). Cases authorizing the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and/or hydra-
tion include: Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987)
(en banc).
7. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 420.
8. Id. at 417.
9. Id. at 420.
10. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-55, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-26 (1985); see also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1365 (2d ed. 1988).
11. The use of feminine pronouns in this Article is intended to encompass both
genders.
12. See Quinlan, wherein the court stated that Karen Quinlan's right to refuse life-
prolonging treatment, which they found to be incident to the right of privacy, "should
not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of
the choice." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
[Vol. 20
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ment by utilizing the legal doctrine of informed consent as opposed
to the constitutional right to privacy. Finally, I will suggest that
the state can best fulfill its role as the guardian of individual auton-
omy by creating procedures which will ensure that, to the greatest
possible extent, individual preferences will have been recorded
prior to the development of incompetence.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The right to refuse treatment has evolved from a narrow privacy
right, dependent on the type of treatment involved and on the pa-
tient's prognosis, 13 to the much broader autonomy right articulated
in Bouvia v. Superior Court,1 4 in which a competent and non-termi-
nally ill quadriplegic woman was allowed to refuse medical treat-
ment. 5 Although most decisions in this area involve patients who
were not expected to live more than one year (with or without
treatment), the judicially articulated scope of the right to refuse
treatment extends beyond these factual situations. In In re Con-
roy, 6 for example, the court stated that the right to accept or re-
fuse medical treatment does not depend on the patient's prognosis
or medical condition, or on the quality of life.' 7 As one commenta-
tor has noted, even though the court's point was that one should
not be deprived of the right to refuse medical treatment by virtue
of becoming incompetent, the argument also implies that patients
should not be denied that right because they are "not debilitated
enough."' 8
The landmark case involving withdrawal of life support, In re
Quinlan, 9 held that the Constitutional right to privacy outweighed
the state's interest in preserving life. 20 The Quinlan case and its
progeny 2' relied on a broadly asserted, but ill-defined view of the
privacy right, borrowed from cases involving reproductive free-
13. See id. ("the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims").
14. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
15. Id. at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300. See infra note 34 and accompanying text for a
more detailed discussion of that case.
16. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1986).
17. Id. at 355, 486 A.2d at 1226.
18. Matthews, Suicidal Competence and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment, 75
CAL. L. REv. 707, 718 n.100 (1987).
19. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
20. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
21. See, e.g., In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983).
19891
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dom. 22 Quinlan limited this particular exercise of the right to pri-
vacy to cases in which the proposed treatment was invasive and the
prognosis was dim.23 However, this construction yielded a right
that was vague and subjective, as it turned on the physician's medi-
cal diagnosis and the type of treatment proposed. In order for this
standard to work, the medical community had to determine
whether a given treatment was "extraordinary" and, therefore,
could be forgone, or if the treatment was merely "ordinary," and
thus mandated regardless of patient autonomy. Dte to the fact
that the medical community has rejected subjective distinctions
based on the sophistication of the treatment at issue, coupled with
the growing technological advances which lengthen the survival
time for even a dim prognosis, courts have moved toward the artic-
ulation of a common law right to refuse medical treatment.2 4
The common law right to refuse treatment is inherent in the in-
formed consent doctrine, which is older and more firmly estab-
lished than the federal constitutional right to privacy. 25 The right
to give informed consent, as opposed to the right to privacy, re-
flects an interest in preserving decisional autonomy and freedom
from non-consensual bodily invasion.26 This distinction is relevant
because, while the constitutional right to privacy is limited by vari-
ous state interests, the common law right to informed consent to
and refusal of treatment is not.27 If the right to refuse treatment
was based on privacy grounds rather than on tort grounds, factors
such as the invasiveness of the proposed procedure and the prox-
imity of death could be used to limit its exercise. 2s However, even
though courts have acknowledged the common law basis for the
right to refuse treatment, they persistently have recited that the
right to refuse treatment is limited by the four "countervailing
state interests"2 9 discussed below. Courts' adherence to a state in-
22. Two of the cases relied on were Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
24. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 436, 497 N.E.2d 626,
636 (1986); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1366-67.
25. Informed consent, derived from tort law, is a conversation in which the health
practitioner tells the patient the diagnosis, proposes a treatment, then discloses the risks
and benefits involved in that treatment, in alternative treatments, and in foregoing treat-
ment. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972);
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1986).
26. Matthews, supra note 18, at 723.
27. See infra notes 30-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of state interests.
28. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1366.
29. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220,
224 (1984) (court held that the right of the patient, as a competent adult, to refuse un-
[Vol. 20
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terest rationale is noted particularly in cases where the withdrawal
of life support is sought by patients or their guardians. Although
these state interests virtually never prevail over the individual's
choice, the very mention of state interests implies a limit on the
patient's right to refuse treatment.
B. Defining the State's Interests in Medical Treatment Decisions
The modern articulation of the state's interest in cases involving
the refusal of medical treatment is found in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 30 which surveyed case law
from 1840 to 1977 and distilled four elements comprising this in-
terest: maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession;
preventing suicide; protecting the interests of innocent third par-
ties; and preserving life.3 In the ensuing discussion, each element
will be analyzed individually in order to clarify its meaning and to
assess its impact on the right of the competent patient to refuse
medical treatment. Once the state's role in treatment decisions is
properly delineated, the justification for state intervention will be
examined in the context of the incompetent patient.
1. Maintaining the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession
Until recently, judicial concern with the ethical integrity of the
medical profession was commonly mentioned as the decisive factor
in decisions ordering treatment over a patient's refusal. 32 For ex-
wanted medical treatment, is outweighed by the various state and personal interests
urged by the hospital); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(court held that the competent adult's right to privacy encompasses an expression of the
sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination and that such right prevails over
state interests); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 432-40, 497 N.E.2d
626, 634-38 (1986) (court held that although the state's interest in life must be consid-
ered, greater weight should be given to the finding that if a patient was able to do so, he
would decide to discontinue the feeding tube); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-49, 486
A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985) (court denied request to withdraw feeding tube because the pa-
tient never expressed an opinion on life-sustaining treatment, the treatment was not par-
ticularly painful, and no trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused the
feeding tube was presented).
30. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). Saikewicz involved a severely retarded
adult who was suffering from leukemia. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 419. The court allowed
the patient's guardian to refuse medical treatment on the patient's behalf. Id. at -, 370
N.E.2d at 435.
31. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
32. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 583, 279 A.2d 670, 673
(1971). The court concluded that the interests of the "hospital and its staff, as well as the
State's interest in life warranted the transfusion of blood." Id. at 584, 279 A.2d at 674.
Note, however, that even though the court cites this interest as the basis for its holding, it
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ample, John F Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston 33 involved an
adult Jehovah's Witness who was given a blood transfusion even
though her physicians were notified of her religious opposition to
transfusions.34 The New Jersey court asserted that doctors and
nurses are trained to preserve life, and that they should not be
asked to compromise their professional judgment.35 The law gov-
erning physician-patient relations has changed so dramatically
since the early 1970s, however, that recent cases which deal with
the refusal of medical treatment only have addressed this particu-
lar state interest in passing.36
In large part, the movement away from this rationale is due to
the fact that physicians themselves have encouraged the recogni-
tion of patient autonomy and have rejected the notion that their
professional ethics will be violated if aggressive treatment is not
pursued in all cases.3 7  The Saikewicz decision illustrates this
change:
Recognition of the right to refuse necessary treatment in the ap-
propriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical mo-
res; such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the
medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for such
patients or the state's interest in protecting the same.38
More recently, courts have started to note this change in the medi-
cal profession's view of treating the competent, non-terminal pa-
tient. 39 For example, a California court cited the policy statements
of the American Medical Association and the American Hospital
Association in support of its decision that a competent, non-termi-
nal individual is entitled to hasten her death by refusing life-sup-
porting treatment. 4°
fails to show how patient autonomy threatened the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 578, 279 A.2d at 671.
35. Id. at 582, 279 A.2d at 673.
36. See Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225; Satz, 362 So. 2d at
163; Brophy, 398 Mass. at 438-39, 497 N.E.2d at 638; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at -, 370
N.E.2d at 427.
37. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Deciding to Forego Life-
Sustaining Treatment (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1983).
38. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27.
39. See Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at -, 370
N.E.2d at 426.
40. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305
(1986). In reality, it seems that physicians have not fully ceded decision-making to the
patient because cases in this area arise when physicians insist on treating patients over the
opposition of either the patient or her family. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102
[Vol. 20
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2. Protecting the Interest of Innocent Third Parties
The second asserted state interest, like the first, fails to focus on
the well-being of the patient. In the context of the refusal of medi-
cal treatment, the state has claimed an interest in protecting inno-
cent third parties that "is exemplified when the refusal of treatment
and subsequent death results in the abandonment of minor chil-
dren."4 1 In such cases, the state intervenes as parens patriae4 2 in
order to protect the health and welfare of a child.43 In essence, the
state is "solely concerned with seeing to it that minor children are
cared for and are not abandoned.""
The cases which deal with the interest of innocent third parties
are few, but the facts are usually the same: the patient is a compe-
tent woman who is a practicing Jehovah's Witness and who is also
either pregnant or the mother of minor children.4" The state's in-
tervention in these cases is not easily justified, especially since a
parent who finds herself unable to care for her child is allowed to
turn the child over to the state for foster care or adoption. If the
state cannot force a woman to be a parent, then it follows that the
state should not force a woman to accept medical treatment be-
cause of her status as a parent. Also troubling is the fact that all of
HARV. L. REV. 375, 429 (1988). What has changed is that because the medical commu-
nity recognizes the individual's right to refuse treatment, a judge can no longer premise a
decision to override a patient's refusal of treatment on the medical profession's ethical
mandate to treat. Id. at 420.
41. St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)(citing
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Ap. 1978)). See also In re Presi-
dent and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964).
42. See infra note 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the parens patriae
doctrine.
43. Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical Treatment
over Parental Religious Objectionsfor Child Whose Life Is Not Immediately Endangered,
52 A.L.R.3D 1118 (1973); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 16 (1969).
44. Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
45. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, cert. denied 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (court held that the state's concern for the
welfare of the unborn child justified a blood transfusion over the objection of the pregnant
woman, a Jehovah's Witness); In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006,
491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (court held that although a pregnant woman in critical
condition has an important interest in exercising her religious beliefs, she could not refuse
a blood transfusion because of the state's interest in protecting the unborn child); In re
Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (court held
that under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state's interest in protecting minor children
from abandonment prevailed over the competent mother's refusal to consent to the ad-
ministration of blood or blood products). See also Rhoden, Cesareans and Samaritans,
15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 118, 118-25 (1987) (while the reported cases are few, the
incidence of court-ordered cesarean sections is as high as several thousand each year).
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the cases of forced treatment occur with female patients, thus rais-
ing the concern that women are not being allowed the same auton-
omy and freedom of religion that is granted to men.46
Similarly, in addressing the issue of compelling women to un-
dergo cesarean sections, one commentator noted that the entire
legal premise of forcing medical treatment on patients for the bene-
fit of third parties lacks merit.47 In addition to abandoning their
children, "parents take health risks, such as hang gliding, sky div-
ing, or joining the U.S. army, that could potentially result in their
children being orphaned. ' '4 8 That commentator sees "no good rea-
son why here, but not elsewhere, parenthood should obliterate per-
sonal autonomy.' 4 9
Regardless of whether one supports the forced treatment of the
competent and curably ill patient on the grounds that such patient
has minor children, this basis for intervention is seldom pursued in
cases involving the withdrawal of life support. It is difficult to ap-
ply the justification of preventing the abandonment of minor chil-
dren to a mother in a permanent vegetative state.
3. Prevention of Suicide
The third focus of state concern is the prevention of suicide.
Theoretically, the state interest in preventing suicide should be
triggered whenever a patient's refusal of medical treatment would
lead to her death. In cases involving the refusal of medical treat-
ment, however, courts generally avoid this issue by distinguishing
between committing suicide (actively causing one's own death) and
46. For example, a Florida trial court recently ordered a transfusion for a woman
who was a married mother of two minor children. Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So.
2d 679, 680-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). The court, in distinguishing this case from one
decided in the same state two years earlier in which the father of a minor child was
allowed to refuse treatment, St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), held that "the right of these two children to be reared by two parents is an
overriding reason [for ordering treatment]." Wons, 500 So. 2d at 683. The appellate
court reversed, reasoning that because they have a father, "Mrs. Wons' probable, but not
certain, demise... will not result in an abandonment of her two minor children." Id. at
688.
47. Rhoden, supra note 45, at 120.
48. Id.
49. Id. A troubling new trend has emerged recently, in which pregnant drug abusers
are being charged with child abuse by virtue of their drug use during pregnancy, and such
abusers are losing custody of their newborns. Along the same lines, certain judges have
recently given longer than ordinary prison sentences to drug-abusing pregnant convicts in
order to keep them under state supervision. (Given the notorious levels of drug abuse
within our prisons, one might well question the effectiveness of such an strategy, if not its
legality). See The Pregnancy Police, on Patrol, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 6, 1989,
at 50.
804 [Vol. 20
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simply allowing a disease to run its natural course.5 °
In Cruzan, the Missouri court confronted the weakness of this
distinction by noting that if the patient's right to refuse treatment
is as broad as present case law indicates, it would always override
the state's interest in preserving life, regardless of the patient's
prognosis or medical condition.5 In other words, a patient whose
death could be prevented by medical treatment may refuse this
treatment and thereby choose to die. The court concluded that
this judicial standard would not only reveal the absence of a state
interest in preventing suicide, but would actually "lead[ ] to the
judicial approval of suicide."52
Although the court plainly disapproved of the subordination of
the state interest in preventing suicide to the individual right to
refuse treatment, it did not develop its analysis of the state's inter-
est into a mandate for judicial intervention in all refusals of "medi-
cally necessary treatment. 53 Instead, the court focused on the
50. For example, Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297 (1986) involved the refusal of medical treatment by a patient who had attempted
suicide several times and had indeed asserted in her first pleading that she wanted to die.
Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306. The trial court concluded that the patient could not
refuse life support because her real goal was to commit suicide. Id. at 1144, 225 Cal.
Rptr. at 305. The appellate court rejected this, declaring that she did not wish to die, but
had merely "resigned herself to accept an earlier death, if necessary, rather than live by
feedings forced upon her by means of a nasogastric tube." Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at
306 (citing Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984);
Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978)). The concurring opinion
rejected the claim that Bouvia did not seek to commit suicide, and instead decried both
the plaintiff's need to "stultify her position before this court by disavowing her desire to
end her life," and the fact that "even the majority opinion here must necessarily dance
around the issue." Id. at 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring).
51. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417-18.
52. Id. at 422 (citing L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1367).
53. Such an argument would have been difficult to sustain. As Saikewicz and its
progeny make clear, the state maintains an interest in preventing suicide. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 425. However, the law no longer treats suicide as a crime, but
rather, views it as an expression of mental illness. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 433,
667 P.2d 1176, 1178, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163, 165 (1983). This view shapes the nature of the
state response to suicide and suicide attempts. A recent article lists two justifications for
this state interest: the state's parens patriae power to protect individuals, and the harm to
the general welfare which a suicide may engender. Bloch, The Role of Law in Suicide
Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment - A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39
STAN. L. REV. 929, 935 (1987). The parens patriae doctrine refers to the government's
power of guardianship over incompetent persons, and requires that the state ascertain the
competence of the decision-maker. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (5th ed. 1979).
Although the law presumes that those attempting suicide are incompetent, it would seem
that one who was competent, yet chose to die (e.g., by refusing medically necessary treat-
ment) would not trigger the state's parens patriae power. Indeed, this was the result
reached in Bouvia. See supra note 15.
As an example of the potential harm to the general welfare, Bloch notes the contagious
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other justifications for state intervention, and found a more suita-
ble anchor in the state interest in preserving life.54
4. The State Interest in Preserving Life
While the preservation of life would seem to be the core of the
state's power to intervene in cases involving the refusal of medical
treatment, in practice it is a relatively weak, ambiguous concern.
Indeed, until Cruzan, none of the cases ordering treatment did so
based on this factor alone.15 Both the basis for and the meaning of
this state interest are elusive. In the context of the incurable pa-
tient refusing treatment, Saikewicz defined this general interest as
"[t]he interest of the state in prolonging a life."' 56 Rather than ex-
plaining the source and nature of this interest, however, the court
simply stated that such an interest is very high "where the afflic-
tion is curable," but that the state may not order that an incurable
affliction be prolonged through treatment.
57
Like the court in Saikewicz, the Cruzan court discussed the
existence of a state interest in preserving life, without explaining its
source or defining its scope.5 8 But the Cruzan court's interpreta-
tion of this interest was broader than that described by Saikewicz,
and the court used this broadly drawn interest to mandate treat-
ment in a case in which there was no hope of a cure.59
The fact pattern in Cruzan differed from Saikewicz in that while
Nancy Cruzan's condition was not curable, her present vegetative
condition was not considered "terminal."60 However, a careful
effect of suicide, seen especially among adolescents. Bloch, supra, at 937. Though troub-
lesome, this potential harm does not explain the state's interest in preventing suicide by
competent adults. Rather, it simply asserts that the state should get involved because of
the risk that more individuals will choose to end their lives. In any case, this reasoning is
not persuasive when applied to individuals refusing medical treatment because these
deaths are highly unlikely to cause or to result from such an effect. Id. at 938 n.63.
54. For an excellent analysis of suicide and the right to refuse lifesaving treatment,
see Matthews, supra note 18, which proposes a redefinition of the state interest in
preventing suicide so as to make it a substantial factor to be weighed in refusal of treat-
ment cases.
55. Even the relatively early case, John F Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston,
justified its order for medical intervention on "the interest of the hospital and its staff, as
well as the State's interest in life." Heston, 58 N.J. at 584, 279 A.2d at 674.
56. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
57. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
58. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
59. Id. at 412, 422.
60. Id. at 412. While subtle, there is a significant difference between focusing on the
terminal diagnosis and focusing on the ability of medicine to cure the ailment. The for-
mer refers only to a status which, as Karen Quinlan showed by surviving for eight years
after her respirator was removed, is approximate at best. See also B. SIEGEL, LOVE,
[Vol. 20
HeinOnline  -- 20 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 806 1988-1989
Withdrawal of Life Support
reading of the Saikewicz ruling reveals that the decision turned not
on the "terminal" nature of Joseph Saikewicz's cancer, but rather
on whether the proposed treatment would cure him.6 Because all
parties to Cruzan agreed that present treatment only maintained
Nancy's life, and could not cure her,62 the court was clearly wrong
when it cited Saikewicz and its predecessors as legal authority for
the proposition that "the state's interest in prolonging life is partic-
ularly valid in Nancy's case ... [because] Nancy will continue a
life of relatively normal duration if allowed basic sustenance. "63
Putting aside the dispute over terminal versus incurable illness,
the task remains one of justifying the state's interest in prolonging
life in the first place. In a different context, one court has held that
the state has a "substantial and compelling" interest in a "strong,
healthy, robust, taxpaying citizenry," and that it has "a right to
protect a person from himself and to demand that he protect his
own life."'  Inherent in this holding is a conception of governmen-
tal authority that is "at odds with the ideal of individual freedom
that guides American jurisprudence. ' 65 Why should the state have
a right to force a competent individual to accept medical treatment
when its refusal poses no identifiable threat of harm to others?66
One might argue that courts do not explain or justify the state
interest in prolonging life because that interest stems from deep-
seated convictions about the role of the government in protecting
and defending its citizens. When the patient refusing treatment is
competent, however, the state's intervention is designed not to de-
fend the individual's choice, but rather to impose a choice of its
MEDICINE, AND MIRACLES (chronicling the recoveries of patients diagnosed as termi-
nally ill). By focusing on curability, one can assess the patient's options, asking what
medicine can do, and what benefit such actions afford to the patient. A condition might
be incurable, yet not terminal. The question then is whether or not the patient wishes to
continue living, given that her present condition cannot be ameliorated.
61. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
62. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 422.
63. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
64. State ex reL Swann v. Peck, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 954 (1976) (barring a man from handling poisonous snakes in a religious ritual).
65. Matthews, supra note 18, at 730. Moreover, even if this concept of authority is
justifiable, such a justification is irrelevant when applied to the vegetative patient on life
support who lacks the ability to produce tangible social benefits such as tax dollars. Id.
66. Economic justifications for forcing certain behaviors spring to mind. However,
even these are often premised on harm to others. For example, the state can force motor-
cycle riders to wear helmets not because that will prevent them from dying, but because
the costs of injuries arising from accidents associated with motorcycles are often borne by
society. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1372. Such justifications do not apply to the
refusal of medical treatment, where the economic costs of forcing a patient to accept
treatment are clearly higher than those of allowing a patient to forego treatment.
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own. This outcome conflicts with the view of the government as
the ultimate protector of its citizens, unless a presumption is made
that all citizens who refuse treatment are incompetent and require
the state's intervention. However, even that assumption does not
mandate a decision to prolong life in all cases, as the state's role is
to act in the best interests of one who is unable to make decisions
for herself.
Because of these difficulties in articulating the basis for a state
interest in prolonging life, the Missouri Supreme Court chose to
rest its decision in Cruzan on an aberrant legal twist of the state
interest: "the interest in the sanctity of life itself."' 67 Without cit-
ing any authority (legal or otherwise) for the proposition, the court
asserted that this concern "rests on the principle that life is pre-
cious and worthy of preservation without regard to its quality. '68
While such a moral principle may stem from the underpinnings
of our society, as a legal imperative it lacks definition. In order to
convert such a maxim into a rule of law, its scope and the limita-
tions it imposes on individual rights must be clear. The court did
not address this definition because it perceived the principle as
manifest. It was on the basis of this unsubstantiated state interest
that the Missouri court mandated ongoing treatment for Nancy
Cruzan:
The state's concern with the sanctity of life ... is especially im-
portant when considering a person who has lost the ability to
direct her medical treatment. In such a circumstance, we must
tread carefully, with due regard for those incompetent persons
whose wishes are unknowable but who would, if able, choose to
continue life-sustaining treatment.69
It is noteworthy that the court's decision to focus solely on refusals
of treatment on behalf of incompetent patients frees it from the
difficult task of reconciling its assertion of a state interest in the
sanctity of life with the right of the competent, informed patient to
refuse treatment. Instead, the argument rests on the claim that it is
impossible to know what the incompetent patient would choose to
do in this precise situation and, therefore, the court must "provide
shelter for those who would choose to live - if able to choose." '70
The broad reasoning of Cruzan would ban virtually all refusals of
life supporting treatment on behalf of incompetent patients.
67. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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C. Redefining the State Interest in Preserving Life
The Cruzan decision brings one no closer to understanding the
state's interest in preserving life in the context of the refusal of
medical treatment. Centuries ago, a government might have pre-
mised a right to intervene either on the need for a larger population
or perhaps on the need for money, but relations between the state
and its citizens have undergone great changes in the last 200 years.
When addressing the right to refuse treatment, courts regularly
quote John Stuart Mill, crediting him with establishing the modern
conception of individual rights vis-a-vis the state:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or to forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do
so would be wise or even right.7'
The principle of autonomy limits the state's control over the com-
petent individual and it appears throughout American legal his-
tory. In 1914, Justice Cardozo stated that: "[E]very human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an opera-
tion without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he
is liable in damages. '7 2 No mention is made of a state interest lim-
iting this right. In 1928, Justice Brandeis echoed this sentiment:
"The makers of our Constitution ... sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone
- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man." 73
Given this understanding of the primacy of individual auton-
omy, I propose that the state's interest in the preservation of life is
not a general mandate for government intervention whenever an
individual's act puts her life in potential jeopardy, but rather, con-
stitutes a state duty to protect the autonomy or the right of the
competent individual to choose to live. When an individual refuses
medical treatment, the state's first concern should be whether that
individual is competent to make medical decisions. If there is no
71. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1974).
72. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914).
73. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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doubt as to competency, then the state must respect and defend the
individual's autonomous choice. If, however, the individual is per-
manently incompetent, the state does not, as the Cruzan decision
suggested, suddenly gain an overriding interest in preserving life.
Rather, the state is obligated to aid in effectuating the choice that
individual would have made had she been able to do so.
Courts facing the dilemma of ascertaining the wishes of an in-
competent patient have been troubled by the inherent uncertainty
in making treatment decisions.74 To that end, they have posited
that "[t]he only practical way to prevent destruction of the right
(to privacy) is to permit the guardian and family.., to render their
best judgment . . . as to whether she would exercise it in these
circumstances. '7 5 This standard is known as the substituted judg-
ment test, and it is probably the most influential decision-making
tool in this entire line of cases.76
The Cruzan court rejected the rationale of substituted judgment
as ill-conceived because even when there is evidence of the patient's
attitudes toward life support in the abstract, that evidence cannot
be considered an informed refusal of treatment.77 The Cruzan
court's solution to this problem with substituted judgment was to
assert a state interest which could easily be expanded to negate the
right to refuse treatment for all patients:
Given the fact that Nancy is alive and that the burdens of her
treatment are not excessive for her, we do not believe that her
right to refuse treatment ... outweighs the immense, clear fact of
life in which the state maintains a vital interest.78
Hiding behind an abstract, unfounded state interest, the Cruzan
court has revoked the incompetent patient's right to self-determi-
nation and sidestepped the ugly reality of its mandate of years of
what Justice Cardozo would call an on-going battery for the per-
manently vegetative individual on life support. 79 Decisions of this
type, in which an individual's fate is entirely in the court's hands,
demand an outcome which is grounded in carefully reasoned legal
principles, rather than dictated by political niceties and unsubstan-
tiated state interest.
Determining an individual's wishes in regard to treatment will
74. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1368.
75. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992
(1976).
76. Rhoden, supra note 40, at 384.
77. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
78. Id. at 424.
79. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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be easy in some cases, such as when the adult patient anticipated
her demise and left prior treatment directives, and harder in
others, such as when the patient is a mentally retarded adult. De-
spite the occasional difficulty of the task, courts cannot retreat
from it by following Cruzan. The remainder of this Article will
address this problem of decision-making for the incompetent pa-
tient, given the state's duty to respect and defend individual
autonomy.
III. REFUSAL OF TREATMENT FOR THE PERMANENTLY
INCOMPETENT PATIENT
Substituted judgment, the legal doctrine by which courts pres-
ently attempt to effectuate the incompetent person's desires, in-
volves one of three scenarios.8 0 First, the patient, when competent,
may have unequivocally indicated the decision she would make in
the event of her incompetency, and in such circumstances courts
generally follow those wishes.8' Second, where the patient has not
given an explicit indication of her wishes or views regarding life
support, but a close friend or relative can attest to the patient's
likely decision, that person may be allowed to decide in the pa-
tient's name.82 Third, if there is no basis for ascertaining the pa-
tient's preferences, a decision will be made "according to what
would be in the patient's 'best interests' as defined by the court, by
the patient's family, or by a court-appointed guardian."8 3
A. Consent, Informed Consent, and the Right to Refuse
Treatment
Cruzan openly objected to the first two of these three practices.8 4
The court's argument was based on the doctrine of informed con-
sent, which empowers a patient to accept or reject medical treat-
ment.85 To give informed consent, the patient must have the
capacity to reason and make judgments, the decision must be made
voluntarily, and the patient must understand the risks and benefits
80. The following remarks draw heavily from L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1368-70.
81. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985); In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 376-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-74 (1981).
82. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 131-32, 660 P.2d 738, 748 (1983).
83. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 363-68, 486 A.2d at 1231-33; see also In re Guardianship of
Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810,
820, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984).
84. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
85. Id.
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of the treatment alternatives and of non-treatment.8 6 "In the ab-
sence of these three elements," the Cruzan court claimed, "neither
consent nor refusal can be informed. Thus, it is definitionally im-
possible for a person to make an informed decision - either to
consent or to refuse - under hypothetical circumstances .... ,
Because Nancy Cruzan was unable to consent, the court concluded
that the state's interest in preserving life dictated continued
treatment. 88
From the above discussion of Cruzan, one understands that the
court's arguments as to the state's interest in preventing suicide
and preserving life are flawed.89 A second flaw is seen in the
Cruzan court's application of the informed consent doctrine in the
case of an incompetent patient. The relevant legal theory in
Cruzan is that of consent, not informed consent, because the issue
is not how much information must be given to the patient in order
to enable her to make a treatment decision, but whether treatment
should be provided given that the patient is unable to consent.
Treatment absent consent, even if perfectly performed and benefi-
cial, is a battery.9"
In contrast, the one occasion on which treatment may be ren-
dered absent the incompetent patient's (or her guardian's) consent
is in the event of an emergency. This occurs when a patient is
unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting and the harm
threatened by the failure to treat is imminent and outweighs any
harm threatened by proposed treatment. 9' It is important to note
that the legal rationale for the involuntary treatment in such cases
is not the state's interest in preserving life, but the assumption that
a reasonable person would consent to treatment under these cir-
cumstances. In other words, consent is implied for the duration of
the emergency. 92 Thus, if the patient were to awaken and choose
to discontinue all ongoing treatment, this choice would be
respected.93
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 419.
89. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
90. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
91. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE, LEGAL MEDICINE: LEGAL DY-
NAMICS OF MEDICAL ENCOUNTERS 197 (1988) [hereinafter LEGAL MEDICINE]. See also
Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970); Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562
(1906); Berlinger v. Lackner, 331 Ill. App. 591, 73 N.E.2d 620 (1st Dist. 1947).
92. LEGAL MEDICINE, supra note 91.
93. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992
(1976).
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While an incompetent person receiving life support may origi-
nally enter the hospital as an emergency patient, obviating the ini-
tial need for express consent, consent can no longer be implied
once the patient has been stabilized. At this point, a guardian must
be appointed to give informed consent to or refusal of ongoing and
additional treatment. 94 This consent process varies depending
upon the extent to which the patient's attitude toward life support
is known.
B. Informed Consent and the Permanently Incompetent Patient
1. Incompetent Patients with Prior Treatment Directives
If the presently incompetent patient anticipated her incompe-
tency by leaving explicit instructions (e.g., refusing life support),
the traditional informed consent doctrine can be applied rather
easily.95 Such instructions are found in oral requests made by pa-
tients suffering from degenerative diseases, 96 in written living wills,
or through the execution of a durable power of attorney granting a
guardian the right to refuse treatment on one's behalf. The court's
reasoning in Cruzan dictates that informed consent is not truly
possible in any of these scenarios because a patient cannot foresee
her future medical condition and is thus rejecting or consenting to
hypothetical treatment only.97 Setting aside the fact that this ob-
jection is not true for those patients suffering from slow, degenera-
tive diseases whose processes are fairly well understood, this
reasoning is ill-founded in a more general sense.
Because patients typically are not medical experts, the treatment
decisions they make in the informed consent scenario can be
viewed as quality of life assessments. The physician explains the
risks and benefits inherent in various solutions to their problem.
The patient then decides whether to live with the problem as it is,
or to follow the physician's recommended course of treatment, in
spite of the risks, in the hopes of improving her quality of life.
From the patient's perspective, the means, or proposed treatment,
cannot be evaluated independently of the end.
For many patients, that end is often a constant: to remain alive
and to regain or maintain one's health. However, for some pa-
94. LEGAL MEDICINE, supra note 91.
95. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1368.
96. See In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (1986), in which a woman
suffering from ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, also known as "Lou Gehrig's disease")
indicated that once she lost her ability to swallow, she did not wish to be intubated.
97. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
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tients, these twin goals are not feasible, and while they may remain
alive through treatment, they will never regain their health. When
this is the case, a patient may choose to articulate her convictions
regarding life with a diminished capacity and death. When she
signs a living will or gives orders regarding her treatment in the
event of future incapacity, she is stating that a given goal (such as
simply maintaining her body once she no longer has any cognitive
brain function), is not important enough to her to permit treat-
ment. In essence, because she would rather die than live that way,
no treatment short of a cure or an improved quality of life will be
acceptable.
2. Incompetent Patients with Unknown Treatment Preferences
Given that the purpose of the right to give informed consent is to
allow a patient to determine what will be done to her body, there
are no reasonable grounds for denying such a right to one who has
made that determination ahead of time.98 Unfortunately, not all
permanently incompetent patients have known wishes regarding
medical treatment. Aside from incompetent patients who have
clearly indicated their future treatment desires, there are two other
types of incompetent patients: those for whom there is either weak
oral testimony or a family/friend's testimony as to their desires,
and those whose wishes are not known. Normally, the informed
consent doctrine requires the court to use an objective standard in
cases where a patient's desires are unclear.99 In an emergency, as
noted above, treatment is given because a reasonable person would
consent to life-saving treatment. This approach is problematic in
two respects: first, the permanently incompetent patient is not per-
manently in an emergency condition; second, courts have little idea
what treatment the reasonable person would consent to, given an
incurable condition. °0
98. The court in In re Conroy held that "[t]he right of an adult who, like Claire
Conroy, was once competent, to determine the course of her medical treatment remains
intact even when she is no longer able to assert that right or to appreciate its effectua-
tion." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 359-60, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
99. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1369.
100. It is interesting to note that in its 1976 decision permitting the withdrawal of life
support to a permanently incompetent patient, the Quinlan court speculated that the
"overwhelming majority ... would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a
choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to them." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at
41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. A 1988 Roper Poll, surveying 1,982 people, found that 58% of
Americans answered positively when asked if a physician should be able to lawfully end
the life of a terminally ill patient who requests it. Roper Organization of New York City,
A Roper Poll (1988).
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Cruzan's solution to this dilemma is to force treatment on all
permanently incompetent patients because there is always the pos-
sibility that a patient might choose to live in these circum-
stances.' 0 Given the frequency of litigation on the withdrawal of
treatment and the popularity of natural death acts and the hospice
movement, it is simply wrong to presume that all such patients
would choose to remain alive. Even the Cruzan court does not
make this claim, since its argument is based on the possibility that
one such person might choose to accept treatment.'02 The prospect
of negating the right to refuse treatment for an entire class of pa-
tients because of the speculative desires of a few is troublesome.
Such a practice relegates those who would have chosen to exercise
their right to refuse treatment to months, if not years of technol-
ogy-dependent existence, with no hope for recovery, no meaningful
interaction with their environments, unknown amounts of physical
pain, and the psychological pain of becoming a tremendous finan-
cial and emotional burden to their families and society.
In fact, if it could be shown that the majority of persons would
not accept life support if they were faced with a permanently vege-
tative existence, then requiring treatment in all cases would be tan-
tamount to a wholesale rejection of the right to autonomy for
incompetent persons. While the majority's will is not always deter-
minative in our constitutional framework, the interests of the mi-
nority are allowed to prevail over those of the majority only when a
specific harm, unique to the minority, can be shown. Granted, the
harm that results from withdrawing treatment from one who
would choose to live is obvious and irrevocable. Equally compel-
ling, however, is the harm done by forcing the majority to accept
treatment; an act which raises the specter of the constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and slavery.0 3
In her recent article considering this dilemma, Nancy Rhoden
proposed that families be given the presumptive authority to make
treatment decisions for their incompetent relatives.' She argued
that substitute judgment evidentiary standards are too stringent,
101. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 427.
102. Id. at 419.
103. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIII. Note that petitioners raised this argument in
the Quinlan case, but it was rejected as irrelevant to situations other than the imposition
of penal sanctions. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 37-38, 355 A. 2d at 662. At that time, however,
the extent to which "life" could be prolonged via life support was uncertain and more
limited, so that a decision to maintain treatment was not tantamount (as it is today) to a
"life sentence."
104. Rhoden, supra note 40, at 379.
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and that families should be permitted to decide simply because
they have the best ability to anticipate the patient's desires. 105
While her argument is persuasive, it will not entirely resolve the
problem because there always will be incompetent patients who
lack family and friends to make such a determination for them.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop an objective standard to assist
courts and guardians in making decisions on behalf of those per-
manently incompetent, vegetative patients whose attitudes toward
life support are simply not known.
IV. ENCOURAGING AND ALLOWING SELF-DETERMINATION:
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS AND THE
ROLE OF SOCIETY
It is less than ideal to be forced to use an objective standard to
determine whether to use life support for an incompetent patient.
Several alternatives are available to minimize the frequency with
which courts or guardians will be faced with this dilemma.
First, courts should relax the evidentiary standard by which they
evaluate the less-than-explicitly expressed treatment desires of
those now incompetent. Because young, healthy people seldom
have occasion to make formal declarations about their feelings re-
garding life-support in the event of sudden and irreversible dam-
age, more weight should be given to casual remarks made to family
and friends. For example, the trial court in the Cruzan case
"found that Nancy expressed 'in somewhat serious conversation,'
that if sick or injured, she would not want to continue her life un-
less she could live 'halfway normally.' ",106 The court dismissed
this statement, stating that " 'informally expressed reactions to
other people's medical condition and treatment do not constitute
clear proof of a patient's intent.' " 07 In doing so, it condemned
105. Id. at 437.
106. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
107. Id. at 424 (quoting In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 412, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (1987)).
This is by no means an ideal solution to the problem. While one could argue that such
evidence is the best indication we have of a patient's desires, and that there is little incen-
tive for the patient to be other than truthful, courts are wary of such testimony for good
reason. Because the individual does not truly anticipate future misfortunes, such com-
ments are not offered as serious instructions, but rather as general remarks. One cannot
be sure that the individual would still feel the same when the actual choice was upon her.
The same holds true for all testimony by family and friends regarding the incompetent
individual's values, way of life, and inferred attitudes toward life support. While there
may be no reason to doubt the sincerity of those speaking on behalf of the incompetent
patient, the possibility of error or uncertainty will always remain. L. TRIBE, supra note
10, at 1369. Moreover, even if courts were to rely more heavily on testimonial evidence,
there would still be cases in which no reliable evidence is available.
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her to thirty years of an existence she most likely does not want.
To assist the courts, all competent persons must be encouraged
to make known their wishes regarding life-support and other medi-
cal treatment in the event of future incompetency. This would re-
quire a far greater legislative effort than that seen in this area to
date.' °8 The scope of the Natural Death Acts would have to be
expanded so that they would apply to medical treatment in gen-
eral, regardless of the diagnosis and prognosis.
Further, the public must be urged to complete living wills. En-
couragement could be effected along the lines of current organ do-
nor transplant stickers placed on the backs of drivers' licenses.
Yet, because the stakes for the individual are higher in the case of
authorizing or not authorizing life support, and because the point
at which different individuals would cease treatment will vary, a
sticker might be too simplistic an approach. Another problem
with this system is that only those who have driver's licenses will
be eligible for determining their fate in the event of incompetency.
Therefore, living wills could be completed for example along with
annual income tax returns. These wills could be kept on file and
amended as desired. While such a proposal might seem preposter-
ous and costly, it is certainly no more costly than the alternative of
prolonging death via life support, at a cost of millions of tax dollars
for each patient.
Progress toward the same goal could be made if physicians re-
quire each of their patients to make a written declaration regarding
life support. Such documents would become part of a patient's
permanent medical record, and could be amended at subsequent
visits. In the alternative, hospitals could require the same of all
patients admitted to the facility. While this would certainly
heighten patient anxiety, it would ensure a current and serious con-
sideration of the subject.
Given that the foregoing suggestions will not entirely eliminate
the problem of uncertainty in prolonging the life of incompetent
persons via life support, formal efforts to assess society's attitudes
toward life support in various contexts must be made. While
courts have made judgments based on the "reasonable person"
standard for hundreds of years without ever bothering to consult
social scientists, or even to make their own surveys, this is an occa-
sion where outside expert input is needed. Once there are reliable
indications of the majority's attitudes toward life-sustaining treat-
108. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1370.
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ment given various physical and mental complications, courts will
have the evidence they need to support a decision to order or to
refuse treatment. An informed decision has the great advantage of
being based not on the assertion of an irrelevant state interest, but
rather on the standard consistent with American law regarding all
medical treatment: the response of the competent person, where
available and, where not, the response that would be given by a
"reasonable person."
V. CONCLUSION
To date, instead of attempting to determine whether a reason-
able person would choose to live under severely compromised con-
ditions, courts rely on subjective determinations of the patient's
"best interests." 10 9 This generally mandates continuing life sup-
port. While it is understandable that judges are uncomfortable de-
termining if life under certain conditions is actually worse than
death, a great injustice is done to the incompetent patient by avoid-
ing the question. The artificial maintenance of Nancy Cruzan's
body against the wishes of her parents and to the extent we can
discern, against her wishes as well," 0 is a testament to this
injustice.
Technology, in its relentless progress toward greater postpone-
ment of death, will leave us each year with more and more individ-
uals suspended in a twilight existence. There is a more sane, more
humane response to them, and to us, than to force them to wait out
the limits of technology.
109. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1369.
110. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
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